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Brain death, whether it be brain stem death (theterm used in the United Kingdom) or whole-
brain death (the term used in the United States), is a
prerequisite for heart-beating organ donation and is
therefore a fundamental factor in the process of organ
and tissue donation for transplantation. Understanding
how brain death may be perceived by those family
members approached about organ donation is an
important issue to explore as biomedicine moves to
expand the range of end-of-life technologies that,
potentially, blur the demarcation between life and
death. This review of the organ donation literature
aims to provide some insights into this issue.
Researchers from many disciplines (anthropology,
psychology, sociology, nursing, and medicine), policy
makers, government bodies, professional organiza-
tions, charities, and patient groups have carried out or
sponsored research seeking to answer the ever-present
question: Why, in the face of generally positive public
views regarding organ donation and transplantation,
are donation rates across the world falling short of
demand? Chronologically, we see research directed at
different aspects of this question as far back as the
1970s and continuing up to the present day. Studies
have focused on the public’s views of transplantation
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Notice to CE enrollees:
A closed-book, multiple-choice examination after this
article tests your ability to accomplish the following
objectives:
1. Identify specific issues pertaining to the literature review
on brain death
2. Discuss the factors why families chose not to donate
3. Understand how brain death may be perceived by family
members approached about organ donation
and the donation of kidneys,1 public attitudes toward
organ donation and transplantation,2-7 comparison of
donor families and the public regarding organ dona-
tion and its benefits,8 gifts of body parts,9 the experi-
ences of families who donated organs or declined
organ donation for transplantation,10-23 decision mak-
ing and organ donation,24-26 factors influencing the
request for organ donation,27-29 and issues surrounding
death and organ procurement.30-34
Importantly, one issue that is a consistent, but minor,
theme within the organ donation research literature
being referred to, but rarely given any detailed atten-
tion until recently, is public concerns regarding the
diagnosis of death.10,30,35 Specifically the following
issue have been identified: the concern that if people
agree to organ donation they may be diagnosed dead
too soon,36 the concern that they or their relatives
would not be dead at the time of organ donation,3,17
and the knowledge and understanding of family mem-
bers and the public regarding brain death.13,18,21,25,32-34
Most of these studies were not focused specifically on
the concept of brain death, the exceptions being
Pearson et al,13 Franz et al,30 Siminoff et al,32-34 and
Dubois and Schmidt,37 but they make valuable contri-
butions and offer potential theoretical frameworks to
aid our understanding of what the diagnosis of death
by brain-based criteria means to family members who
have been approached about organ donation.
Studies have tended to fall into 2 categories: (1)
surveys and qualitative studies exploring the level of
public willingness to donate organs, and obstacles to
organ donation and (2) qualitative studies exploring
the psychosocial factors that may underpin decision
making in relation to organ donation.
Family Membersʼ Knowledge and
Understanding of the Definition of
Brain Death and Brain Stem Death
Studies carried out with donating and nondonat-
ing family members revealed a lack of information
regarding brain death,13,25,30 poor understanding of the
meaning of brain death,29,30 dissatisfaction with the
decision made at request,25 and confusion with other
brain conditions such as coma and the persistent veg-
etative state.30-34
Pearson et al,13 working in Australia, surveyed 69
donating and nondonating family members about their
experiences, their perceptions of the care their relative
received, and any explanations of the underlying diag-
nosis (critical illness), brain death, and organ donation
that they received from health care professionals.
Although most (80%) felt that brain death was well
explained, only 52% were judged to have a good or
satisfactory understanding of brain death, and 55%
would have liked to see diagrams and radiographs to
aid their understanding.13
One of the few studies to make an assessment of
the extent of respondents’ knowledge about brain death,
by using scenarios, was carried out by Franz et al,30 work-
ing in the United States. Franz and colleagues carried
out a cross-sectional telephone survey of 164 next-of-
kin of potential organ donors. They report that a siz-
able number (no figures provided) of donor partici-
pants were confused about whether their relative was
truly dead, and furthermore, that nondonating relatives
(n=62) had less understanding of brain death than did
donating relatives (n=102).
Franz et al30 went on to ask participants a specific
question about brain death with the aim of assessing
their knowledge about the diagnosis of brain death. The
question was, If a person is diagnosed as brain dead, is
a person in a coma or dead? Responses indicated that
95% of donor and 97% of nondonor respondents stat-
ed that their relative was brain dead, but that 28% of
donor and 45% of nondonor respondents stated that
their family member was in a coma. Nine percent of
donors and 10% of nondonors stated that they did
not know.
Respondents were then asked to state whether the
following statements were “true” or “not true”: (1)
Someone who is brain dead is dead even though his or
her heart is still beating, and (2) It is possible for a
brain-dead person to recover from his or her injuries.
In response to statement (1), 12% of donor families
and 27% of nondonor families responded incorrectly
and 8% and 15%, respectively, did not know. (True is
the correct response.) When asked if they agreed with
statement (2), 20% of donor and 52% of nondonor
respondents incorrectly agreed with this statement,
and 6% and 14%, respectively, did not know.
These are important results because they indicate
that the majority of the respondents in this study said
that they understood brain death, but when questioned,
“nearly half of donor and over 80% of all nondonor
respondents answered one or more questions about
brain death incorrectly.”30(p18) This result calls into ques-
tion whether family members who say they understand
that their family member is dead really do understand
this diagnosis relative to medicolegal criteria.30
Siminoff et al33 asked a larger sample of family
members who had (n=232) or had not (n=171) donated
their family members’ organs about their experiences
in the hospital. Siminoff and colleagues assessed family
members’ knowledge in relation to brain death. Family
members of potential organ donors were interviewed
face-to-face and asked about their experience in the
hospital, the family members’ definition of brain death,
the meaning that families gave to the diagnosis of
brain death, their awareness of the testing procedure to
determine brain death, and their acceptance and under-
standing of the brain death diagnosis. Accuracy of the
definition of brain death offered by the participants
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was assessed by the research team, but they do not
offer the definition they used to make this assessment
within the article.33
Most participants (67.2%) gave a partially correct
definition of brain death, and 28.3% gave a complete-
ly correct definition of brain death. Of the 385 family
members who gave a completely or partially correct
definition of brain death, only 61 (15.8%) equated brain
death with death. Consistent with findings from Franz
et al30 and the Gallup Organization,3 Siminoff et al33
found that a sizable number of participants (30%) agreed
with the statement that a person is dead only when the
heart has stopped beating. Siminoff agrees with Franz
et al30 that a significant number of family members of
potential organ donors are confused about the term
brain death, but she reports that the lack of under-
standing did not affect donation decisions. One hun-
dred forty-five of the 232 donating families agreed to
donation, even though they believed the patient to be
alive when diagnosed brain dead.
Siminoff et al33 suggest that the term brain death
has a variety of meanings in everyday speech, only
one of which is that someone is dead according to neu-
rological criteria. It may also indicate someone who is
“severely brain injured” or be applied to “a person who
is unaware of what is happening around him/her.”33(p224)
Siminoff and colleagues33 suggest that these alterna-
tive meanings undermine the public’s understanding
of the medical meaning of this term. These authors
recommend that when approaching family members
about organ donation, health professionals should
“explore” what the family understands about the term
brain death and what implications it has for the fami-
ly. Does the family think the patient is beyond hope
and will not recover? Does the family think the patient
is actually dead? These assessments are “more impor-
tant” than if the family can recite a correct definition
of brain death. Discussion that assesses the individ-
ual’s definition of death is therefore recommended.
Beliefs About the Determination of Death
How do people determine death? In the study by
Siminoff et al,33 it was reported that 30% of their sam-
ple stated that death was determined by the absence of
a heartbeat. Seven years after Franz et al,30 Siminoff et
al34 used scenarios to assess families’ knowledge in
relation to brain death compared with the medicolegal
definition of death. Siminoff et al34 carried out a cross-
sectional telephone survey with 1351 Ohio residents
over the age of 18, using the same methods as Franz
et al30 had used. The specific aim of this study was to
examine public attitudes and beliefs about the deter-
mination of death. A survey instrument was developed
from information gained in 12 focus groups and includ-
ed questions about attitudes toward organ donation
and transplantation, trust in the health care system,
understanding of brain death, and participants’ per-
sonal definition of death. The authors also presented 3
scenarios designed to measure participants’ “personal
assessment of whether or not a person is dead” and
their willingness to donate organs depending on the
medical condition indicated in the scenarios.34
Three scenarios were presented to participants:
Scenario 1: A 22- or 70-year-old is in the hospi-
tal. (Two ages are listed in the scenarios. Participants
were randomly sampled as to which age they would
hear. This variation was done to assess whether the
age of the patient indicated in the scenarios might
play a part in participants’ responses. It did not.) This
patient is on machines (sometimes called mechanical
support or life support) that keep the heart and lungs
working. The patient’s brain no longer functions at
all—there is no brain activity and no brain waves.
(This scenario fulfills criteria for brain death in the
United States.)
Scenario 2: A 22- or 70-year-old is in the hospital.
The patient is on machines that keep the heart and lungs
working. This patient’s brain is so severely damaged
that he/she will never recover. The patient will not
wake up and will not eat or breathe on his or her own.
However, there are still some brain waves left. (This sce-
nario fulfills brain stem criteria in the United Kingdom,
but would not be accepted in the United States.)
Scenario 3: A 22- or 70-year-old is in a nursing
home for 5 years after a severe brain injury. This patient
is not on any life support machines and can breathe
without a machine. However, the patient does need to
be fed by a tube. The patient will not wake up and will
never respond to people or things around him/her.
There are still some brain waves left. (This patient is in
a persistent vegetative state and would not be accept-
able for organ donation in either the United Kingdom
or the United States.)
Participants were asked for their assessment as to
whether the patient in these scenarios was dead or
alive or “as good as dead” and how willing they would
be to donate organs from this patient. Participants’
responses were compared to see if they demonstrated
a consistent or illogical pattern of classification across
the 3 scenarios. The pattern of classification was deemed
inconsistent/illogical if participants classified a patient
with more intact brain function as dead and a patient
with less intact brain function as alive. The authors
were not as interested in whether participants made a
correct classification per medical criteria as they were
interested in personal beliefs about when death occurred.
Only 29.4% (n=399) in fact correctly classified a per-
son as dead or alive in accordance with current med-
ical criteria and the law in the United States.
Scenario 1: 86.2% of 1351 respondents classified
the brain-dead person as dead, and 96.9% of respon-
dents were willing to donate organs from this person.
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Scenario 2: 57.2% of 1351 respondents classified
the severely brain-damaged person on mechanical
support as dead, and 95.6% of respondents were will-
ing to donate organs from this person.
Scenario 3: 34.1% of 1351 respondents classified
this person in a persistent vegetative state as dead, and
94.4% of respondents were willing to donate organs
from this person.
These results suggest that participants have a dif-
ferent concept of death than the present medical criteria,
although the lack of knowledge about the medicolegal
definition of brain death is clearly a factor. The fact
that a sizable number of respondents were willing to
donate the organs of people who are not legally dead
is of specific importance and appears to be related to
issues surrounding quality of life. A complicating issue
for this study though is the hypothetical nature of these
questions and the fact that although public surveys
report the willingness of people to donate and positive
attitudes toward transplantation,3,38,39 when people are in
a position to donate organs, a large percentage do not
donate, therefore calling into question the use of a log-
ical/illogical response frame for these scenarios.
(Refusal rates in the United States are approximately
50%,31,32 and in the United Kingdom 41%, increasing
to 70% in minority ethnic groups.41) Research has
indicated that decision making related to organ dona-
tion is neither consistent nor logical.20
Families Who Chose Not to Donate
In one of the few studies applying a qualitative
paradigm of investigation, Sque et al20 carried out a
cross-sectional study exploring the experiences and
perspectives of family members who declined organ
donation. Sque et al20 interviewed 26 family members
of 23 potential organ donors. All had declined organ
donation. Of the 23 deceased, 9 had expressed a posi-
tive view about donation while alive, 7 held a negative
view, and the views of 7 were unknown to the family
member tasked with decision making. In relation to
the family members: 12 were positive in regard to dona-
tion, 9 were negative, 4 were ambivalent, and the views
of 1 were unknown. New et al40 report that in 95% of
cases where the family knows that the views of the
deceased were pro-donation, donation would occur.
Therefore in a hypothetical situation where the views
of the decision maker matched that of the deceased,
logically, one would expect a positive outcome, that
is, donation. Sque et al20 reported that in 6 cases of
positive pairings, no donation took place.
Therefore logic and even an intention shared with
a family to donate is not the determining factor in all
cases. A nondonation in the scenario reported by Sque
et al20 was linked to participants’ reluctance to relin-
quish their guardianship and ability to protect the body,
concerns about the donation operation, and the issue
that instead of participants’ views embracing the notion
of “the gift of life,” which these authors describe as a
dominant discourse in relation to organ donation, these
participants may be more influenced by the “sacrifice”
that is needed to facilitate organ donation—the sacrifice
of the unmarked, viable-looking body to what partici-
pants perceived to be a potentially mutilating donation
operation. The issue of how the body looks when a
diagnosis of death based on brain criteria has been
made has been reported in other studies.10,14,21
The View of the Body
Pelletier10 explored donating families’ experiences
of the donation process and their perceptions of stress-
ful situations within it. Pelletier carried out semistruc-
tured interviews with 7 family members who had agreed
to organ donation. Pelletier identified 3 stages in the
organ donation process: the anticipation stage, the
confrontation stage, and the postconfrontation stage.
She reports that during each stage family members
confront stressful situations and that the most stressful
situation in the confrontation stage was the diagnosis
of brain death.11 Specifically, 5 family members were
concerned that health care professionals did not explain
sufficiently, or tell them “anything about [the meaning
of] brain death.” Pelletier reports that a second factor
that added to family members’ perceived stress were
signs of viability, such as breathing or a beating heart.
Pelletier10 states that family members experienced
cognitive dissonance as a result of having to accept brain
death as being congruent with personal knowledge of,
beliefs about, and experiences with death.10 (Cognitive
dissonance is described as an emotional state set up
when 2 simultaneously held attitudes or cognitions are
inconsistent or when there is a conflict between beliefs
and overt behavior. The resolution of the conflict is
assumed to serve as a basis for attitude change in that
belief patterns are generally modified so as to be con-
sistent with behavior.42) Pelletier therefore links the
cognitive dissonance experienced by families to (1) a
lack of information provided by health care providers,
(2) personal beliefs, knowledge, and experience of
death, and (3) the signs of viability (of the body).
Dissonance, Conflict, and Anxiety as
Outcomes of Donation Decision Making
The issue of dissonance stimulated during the
organ donation process is articulated in work carried
out in the United Kingdom by Sque.14 In one of the few
studies that offers a theoretical framework (Pelletier,10
Haddow,21 and Sanner,7 reported later, offer other the-
oretical perspectives) in which issues fundamental to
the decision making and subsequent bereavement of
donating family members were investigated, Sque14
explains families’ donation experiences as revolving
around a process of conflict and resolution. Sque14
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developed the Theory of Dissonant Loss, which is
defined as follows: “A bereavement or loss that is
characterized by a sense of uncertainty and psycho-
logical inconsistency. The loss is assured but the
effects of the loss are unknown.”15(p1367)
The theory identifies and illustrates 11 categories
“that describe participants commonly constructed
realities of the donation experience.”15(p1361) These cate-
gories were The last time we were together, Finding
out something is wrong, Waiting for a diagnosis,
Hopes and expectations, Becoming aware that things
are going wrong, Realization of death, Confirmation
of brain stem death, Donation decisions, Saying good-
bye, What do we do now? and Dealing with grief and
donation. These categories offer a sequential descrip-
tion of particular behaviors that were acted out during
each phase of the donation experience. During the
“Confirmation of brain stem death” phase, Sque and
Payne15 describe how participants, even though they
understood that their relative was dead (this was usu-
ally based on some personal interpretation of a change
in the patient’s condition, or just a feeling), experi-
enced conflict due to the “lack of external signs to reflect
the loss of life.” Therefore Sque,14 as did Pelletier,10
linked conflict to the signs of viability as well as other
issues, such as families needing to have a specific time
of death confirmed, family members not understanding
the meaning of brain stem death and the testing pro-
cedures necessary for it, and fear for what might take
place at the time of the organ donation operation.14,15
Haddow21,22 offers a further theoretical perspective
around the experiences of family members involved in
decisions regarding organ donation. Although she dis-
agrees with the findings of Pelletier,10,11 and Sque14 that
families lack understanding of brain death, and that
the sight of a viable body contributes to conflict, or
dissonance, she does agree that making donation deci-
sions causes anxiety and conflict.21,22
Haddow21,22 carried out semistructured interviews
with 19 members of 15 donor families in Scotland.
The results published in Haddow22 focused on the fam-
ilies’ beliefs about death, the dead body, and bonds
with the deceased and whether these beliefs affected
the decision made or the organ donated. Haddow22
also explored whether the families thought that death
caused a “disembodiment,” which she defines as “a
person’s experience of the body and whether individ-
uals feel they have a body, or the alternative of whether
a person feels they are a body.”22(p96) Haddow states
that in this study, and contrary to other findings of
Pelletier,10 Sque,14 and Sque and Payne,15 the sight of a
viable body was not related to confusion about whether
death had or had not occurred. Haddow22(p102) com-
ments that “despite the ambiguity of the dead body’s
appearance, there was no uncertainty about brain stem
death evidenced in this study.”
Haddow22 attributes this lack of uncertainty to the
fact that respondents had articulated a moment of
social death before medical confirmation of brain stem
death due to their prior knowledge of the term brain
stem death gained from television dramas such as
“ER,” “Holby City,” and “Casualty.” This knowledge
underpinned their understanding of the diagnosis. One
respondent, when asked what he understood by the
diagnosis “made a cutting motion at the back of the
neck demonstrating severance of the spinal cord.”22(p100)
Haddow22(p97) argues that respondents held either a
Cartesian dualist perspective that separates the self
and the body or a holistic perspective “that stresses the
inter-connected nature of the self and body.”
Haddow22 makes an interesting comparison between
those participants (n=7) who had some form of med-
ical background and those who did not. She reports
that “some” of those with this background tended to
view the body of the deceased “as an empty car” and
that therefore the parts could be legitimately removed.
This automotive theme is related to the Cartesian
dualist representation of the body/self divide, a view,
Haddow says, that dominates Western medicine
today, and further compares it to a more holistic view
(proposed by Turner, cited in Haddow22) that we are
[sic] our bodies.
Haddow22 initially uses this concept to compare
those with a medical background and those with no
medical background, suggesting that those who hold
this view about the body experience less conflict or
anxiety about the decision to donate and what organs
are to be donated. Those holding a more holistic
embodied view of the body “articulated powerful fears
about whether the donation process would mutilate
the body or cause some form of disrespect.”22(p108) She
undermines the use of the dualistic and holistic per-
spectives of the self and body by saying that “One
should not over emphasize the division between holis-
tic and dualistic embodiment, as such metaphors and
representations are entwined.”22(p105) Furthermore, there
were exceptions to the medical/dualistic and nonmed-
ical/holistic portrayal as Haddow offers quotes from a
respondent that she has categorized as medical
[Cartesian] who clearly indicated that her niece’s
organs were part of her niece (holistic perspective)
and that through their donation she (the niece) would
live on. Haddow22 goes on to say that the newly dead
body remains a powerful representation of self, an
externalization of self, and that initial refusal for organ
donation (as happened in 4 cases) was a result of this
ongoing view of self.
The Ongoing View of Self
Sanner,4 carrying out work in Sweden, offers a
psychological perspective on why this view of self
might influence acceptance or disagreement with
Long et al
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organ donation by highlighting “motive complexes”
in relation to decision making about organ donation.4
(A motive complex is a set of reactions that motivate
or demotivate potential behavior.)
Sanner’s work was carried out with members of
the public almost 20 years ago. This places some lim-
itations on the findings, as the world literature has
indicated that there is no guarantee of donation based
on public views. A further consideration is that when
these data were collected transplantation was still
“considered a new venture,”4(p287) and a controversial
one due to the limited life expectancy of recipients at
that time.
These considerations aside, the theoretical frame-
work that Sanner presents and that she links to deci-
sion making about postdeath procedures on the body
offers a different perspective than those already dis-
cussed and one that may throw some light on psycho-
logical factors that underpin people’s view of death
and what death means to them by looking at post-
death practices.
Sanner’s baseline data, from which she has written
extensively,4-7 were collected in 1988 when she sent a
24-item questionnaire to an age-stratified sample of
1000 residents aged 18 to 29 years, 700 residents aged
30 to 59 years, and 250 residents aged 60 to 75 years
(N = 1950). The response rate was 65% for each
group, giving a final sample size of 1261 residents.
This survey sought to quantify public views, and showed
that although 84% of the population would accept an
autopsy and 80% would sanction a relative’s autopsy,
only 62% would donate their own organs, and even
fewer, 39%, would sanction the use of a relative’s organs
for transplant operations. Anatomic dissection (donat-
ing the whole body for medical science after death)
was the least popular postdeath procedure, with only
15% saying they would sanction this for themselves.
Sanner4 identified particular “discomfort reac-
tions” in relation to postdeath procedures and suggests
that people with intense discomfort reactions tended
to ignore or suppress positive motives toward donating
organs. It is these discomfort reactions that Sanner’s
later work aimed to explore.
In response to a survey of 400 people, Sanner5 inter-
viewed 38 individuals who indicated that they were pos-
itive (n = 22), negative (n = 13), or undecided (n = 3)
about organ donation. Sanner identified 600 statements
that referred to what may or may not be done to the body
after death, and after content analysis of these state-
ments, she constructed 20 “motive” categories. These
categories were analyzed to “discern psychologically
meaningful reaction patterns” by applying a frame of
reference based on psychodynamic defense theory. This
analysis resulted in 6 central motive complexes.5(p1144)
The 6 motive complexes underpinning agreement
or disagreement to postdeath procedures on the body
were the illusion of lingering life, protection of the
value of the individual, distrust, anxiety, and alien-
ation, respecting the limits set by nature or God, altru-
ism, and finally rationality.5 Sanner5 states that the
most common motive complex shown by 35 of the 38
interviewees was the illusion of lingering life, which
she interprets as “an effect of the common death anx-
iety defence called the feeling of immortality.”5(p1147)
This feeling reflects an inability to imagine not expe-
riencing anything when dead. The illusion of lingering
life defines a reaction to potential postdeath proce-
dures whereby “the dead body was ascribed qualities
that only a living individual possesses,” with the con-
sequence that “what is done to the dead person is felt
as if done to a living individual.”5(p1147) Cutting the body,
for example, to remove organs for donation purposes
causes discomfort. Sanner7(p143) says that “only when
the psychological discomfort is weak does the
strength of altruism and rational deliberations based
on empirical facts seem to have any significance for
the willingness to donate.”
The illusion of lingering life could go some way to
explain the view of self extending after death, as dis-
cussed by Haddow22 and also the cognitive dissonance,
conflict, and anxiety discussed by other authors10,14 as
despite the diagnosis of death based on brain criteria
certifying death, the family member may continue to
see the body as alive because it looks alive. Therefore,
what the family member sees and feels (emotionally,
cognitively, metaphorically, spiritually, or pragmati-
cally), at the point of the brain-based diagnosis of
death may influence the decisions they make regard-
ing organ donation.
Non–Heart-Beating Donation
Non–heart-beating donation was the norm before
the introduction of the diagnosis of brain stem death
or brain death, and it may be argued that non–heart-
beating donation mimics a more natural death in that
heartbeat and respiration are seen to have ceased.
The procedure for non–heart-beating organ dona-
tion, however, also has the potential to confront the
family with a paradoxical death.43 If a non–heart-beat-
ing donor is to donate lungs, kidneys, or a liver, the
individual’s heart is allowed to cease for a pre-agreed
period of time (as per guidelines, which can be as
short as 2 minutes duration),44 after which the deceased
is cannulated so that the organs can be perfused with
preservation fluid before organ removal. (There are
specific and separate guidelines for the treatment of
controlled and uncontrolled non–heart-beating dona-
tion. Patient selection is based on the Maastricht clas-
sification.45) Perfusion may result in the heart beating
and neurological stimulation,44 and as these patients
have not been diagnosed dead by brain-based criteria,
are they dead? Could family members see them as
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having suffered a cardiac arrest? Could this use of the
newly dead actually end up lowering donation rates?
The Potential Donor Audit41 indicated that the refusal
rate for non–heart-beating organ donation was 45% of
518 potential donors, which is close to the 40% refusal
rate of 3397 potential donors for heart-beating dona-
tion. This result suggests that there are also barriers to
this means of increasing organ donation, which may
be related to the diagnosis and timing of death. What
current and best practice is lacks explication, and this is
of concern in view of the move to extend the non–heart-
beating donor program in the United Kingdom, as
what this formulation of death means to family mem-
bers has not been addressed in any empirical work.
Conclusions
Despite attempts to separate the diagnosis of
brain death from the process of organ donation and
transplantation, the introduction of the concept of
brain death into legislation triggered a true revolution
during the 1970s, which was decisive in establishing
transplantation programs. Despite this legislation hav-
ing been in place for approximately 30 years, there
are, according toMatesanz46 “still acrimonious religious,
political and pseudoscientific polemics kindled by this
concept” [brain death] in those countries where it is
being initiated or modified.
A sustained increase in the number of organs avail-
able for transplantation may never be achieved until
the concepts of brain death, brain stem death, and now
non–heart-beating death (1) are debated more widely
within society; (2) a greater degree of consensus is
reached within health care; and (3) bereaved family
members approached to donate the organs of their
deceased relative have a better understanding of what
these diagnoses mean.
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1.Which one of the following is a concern for members of the public
asked about organ donation?
a. Their families will be left will all their hospital debt
b. Their wishes will not be honored upon their death
c. They may be diagnosed dead too soon
d. They may be diagnosed dead too late
2.Which one of the following best describes the category of qualitative
studies?
a. Exploring psychological factors that may underpin decision making in
relation to organ donation
b. Exploring physiological factors that may underpin decision making in
relation to organ donation
c. Exploring the level of public willingness to donate organs
d. Exploring the level of obstacles to organ donation
3. In a study by Franz et al, what percentage of respondents identified
the diagnosis of brain death as their relative being brain dead and not
in a coma?
a. 80% of donor families and 82% of nondonor families
b. 95% of donor families and 97% of nondonor families
c. 90% of donor families and 92% of nondonor families
d. 28% of donor families and 45% of nondonor families
4.Which one of the following best identifies the consistent findings
of the 3 studies conducted by Franz et al, Siminoff et al, and the
Gallup Organization?
a. The person is dead when the diagnosis of brain death occurs.
b. The person can recover from a persistent vegetative state.
c. The person is dead only when the heart has stopped beating.
d. The person is dead only when life support is discontinued.
5. According to Siminoff et al, how should healthcare providers
approach families about organ donation
a. Provide families with guidebooks and tell them to find answers to their
questions in the book.
b. Set up family counseling sessions that provide all the answers about
organ donation.
c. Expect families to approach healthcare providers with all their questions.
d. Explore what the family understands about the term brain death and
what implication it has for the family.
6.Which one of the following best describes the reason for a nondonation
in the scenario reported by Sque et al?
a. Nondonation was linked to participants not believing their loved one would
want to donate his or her organs.
b. Nondonation was linked to participants not wanting to make any final decisions
based solely on their experience and knowledge of organ donation.
c. Nondonation was linked to participants’ reluctance to relinquish guardianship
of the body due to the patient’s beliefs and the healthcare providers’ beliefs.
d. The participants were reluctant to relinquish their guardianship and ability to
protect the body and concerned about the donation operation.
7.Which one of the following identifies the stages of the organ donation
process?
a. Postconfrontation stage, ancillary stage, preconfrontation stage
b. Confrontation stage, anticipation stage, and postconfrontation stage
c. Dying process stage, illusional stage, and confrontation stage
d. Confrontation stage, awareness of dying stage, and acceptance stage
8.Which one of the following best describes cognitive dissonance?
a. The emotional state set up when 2 simultaneously held attitudes or cognitions
are inconsistent or when there is a conflict between beliefs and overt behavior
b. The emotional state set up when 3 or more simultaneously held attitudes or
cognitions are inconsistent or when there is a conflict between beliefs and values
c. The psychological state where 2 or more beliefs and values are in constant
d. The emotional state that maintains negative thinking and negative emotions
9.Which one of the following is the grounded theory developed by
Sque et al?
a. Relevant Expressive Loss theory
b. Grounded Loss theory
c. Dissonant Loss theory
d. Conflict Resolution theory
10. Sanner interprets the illusion of lingering life as which of the following?
a. An effect of the common death anxiety defense called the feeling of immortality
b. An effect of the common death experience as what is done to the dead person
is felt as if done to a living individual.
c. The illusion of the continuation of life after the diagnosis of brain death
d. The mental illusion of breathing by the deceased after death occur
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